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Of  the  many  unsolved  mysteries  from  Pleistocene  times,  people  still  ask  why  early  North 
Americans eradicated their large, potentially domesticable animals (e.g., horses), whereas early 
Europeans  did  not.    We  explore  this  question  by  developing  a  paleoeconomic  model  that 
integrates into a co-evolutionary process human hunting investments and wildlife population 
responses.   Our results suggest that investments in hunting ability could have mattered more 
than wildlife “naivety” in explaining the extinction of large animals.   Human investments in 
hunting  and  the  co-evolution  with  large  animals  could  have  both  caused  and  prevented 
extinction.   If human hunting investment depended on the relative scarcity of prey species, 
hunters could have prevented extinction in Eurasia by becoming more adept at hunting less-
scarce species.  While this acquired skill and co-evolution might have prolonged the existence of 
domesticable  animals  in  North  America,  this  would  have  occurred  only  if  this  skill  applied 
exactly to the new species.  Without co-evolution, North American hunters caused extinction 
because they had greater incentive to invest in hunting the large species.   
   1
Introduction 
Archaeologists,  paleontologists,  paleobiologists,  and  anthropologists  have  identified 
several  unsolved  global  puzzles  including  the  origins  of  civilization,  agriculture,  modern 
humans, the colonization of early humans, and why human overkill might have caused a mass 
megafauna extinction (e.g., mammoths) at the end of the Pleistocene (see Gamble 1998; Brook 
and Bowman 2002; Roberts et al. 2001; Alroy 2001; Choquenot and Bowman 1998, Beck 1996, 
Smith 1975). And while many hypotheses have been put forth to address these puzzles, no story 
has been universally accepted.  Researchers have responded to the challenge by turning to more 
formal  analytical  models  to  investigate  various  aspects  of  these  mysteries  (Dark  1995).    A 
common feature of these models, however, is their tendency to abstract away from behavioral 
responses to economic stimuli. These models have largely focused on biological explanations 
(e.g., in the case of the Neanderthal extinction; see Flores 1998), or on results from mechanistic 
models of human-environment interactions that lack fundamental behavioral components (e.g., 
in the case of megafauna extinction; see Mosiman and Martin 1975, Alroy 2001).
1   
But these paleo-puzzles have a common thread—they all depend on human choices.
2  
While primitive in terms of their technologies, early humans are believed to have had the same 
analytical  capacities  as  modern  humans  (Tattersall  and  Schwartz  2000).    One  can  envisage 
without apology that these early humans responded to economic stimuli with some degree of 
rationality (see Smith 1975, Nerlove 1991, 1993, Robson 2001; Mithen 1998).  Since economic 
forces have played integral roles in shaping societies through recorded history, there is no reason 
                                                 
1 The exception is the case of the evolution of certain traits possessed by early humans, as developed in the 
economics literature.   
2 The possible exception is the case of hominid origins.   2
to discount the influence of economic incentives in the pre-historic dawning of humanity.
3 
  And while some economists have recognized the potential contribution that economics 
might  offer  in  addressing  paleo-puzzles  (Smith  1991),  research  into  these  behavioral 
underpinnings has been lacking.
4  In this paper we examine whether an explicit accounting of 
economics matters in addressing one important paleoeconomic puzzle—why did early North 
Americans eradicate their large, potentially domesticable animals such as horses and camels, 
whereas early humans preserved a similar group of animals in Europe? This question matters 
because its final outcome has had global implications.  Biologist Jared Diamond (1992, 1997), 
for instance, argues that current patterns of power and control of natural resources can be traced 
back  to  the  question  of  domestication  of  large  animals.    Domesticated  animals  facilitated 
agricultural production to feed a growing population (cattle, horses), enabled countries to create 
powerful  armies  (horses),  and  allowed  people  to  develop  resistance  to  germs  and  bugs  that 
animals carry.  These factors explain why people who first domesticated large mammals gained 
an advantage over the rest—particularly in the Americas where the horse went extinct along with 
the vast majority (70–80 percent or more) of the continents’ large mammals (e.g., the mammoth, 
giant ground sloth, camel, and dozens of others) (Diamond 1992).  Had Americans preserved 
these animals, today’s world might look different.   
Understanding the underlying behavioral forces that led to the extinction of domesticable 
                                                 
3 The interaction between economic and biological systems is now known to be critically important, as it must have 
been long ago when humans depended more on their environment for survival.  See for example Shogren and 
Crocker’s (1999) discussion on the lack of and need for better integration of economics into the biology of 
environmental risk assessment; and Crocker’s (2001) critique on how economic circumstances affect biological 
definitions of resilience and biodiversity.   
4 Smith (1975) and Nerlove (1993), for instance, suggest economic models might help explain megafauna 
extinction. And in a related vein, Brander and Taylor (1998) develop an economic model to explain cultural decline 
on Easter Island.   Another exception is the area of human evolution.  Several studies explore how biological, 
economic, and environmental forces may have affected the natural selection of certain human traits such as 
preferences and associated economic behaviors (e.g., Robson 2001, Rogers 1994, Hansson and Stuart 1990, 
Bergstrom 1996) and inter-personal relationships (Bergstrom 1996).   3
animals in America becomes important.  One behavioral hypothesis that has received attention is 
co-evolution.    Co-evolution  is  a  multi-directional  process:  economic  systems  influence  the 
evolution  of  biological  systems,  and  biological  systems  influence  the  evolution  of economic 
systems, including technological and institutional innovations (Norgaard 1984).  In the present 
context, the commonly-held co-evolution hypothesis is that prey species were ‘experienced’ (not 
naïve)  in  Europe  because  they  had  co-evolved  with  humans  and  earlier  hominids  such  as 
Neanderthals,  starting  at  a  time  when  hominids’  hunting  skills  were  relatively  undeveloped 
(Diamond  1997;  Leaky  and  Lewin  1996;  Brook  and  Bowman  2002).    The  interaction  with 
Neanderthals and early modern humans resulted in evolution selecting traits that enabled these 
species to more effectively evade their human adversaries.  Also, Neanderthals and early modern 
humans  co-evolved  with  their  prey.    Over  many  millennia,  they  developed  more  advanced 
hunting strategies and technologies that enabled greater kill rates per hour of labor.  In contrast, 
prey species were ‘naïve’ in America.  Hominids did not arrive in America until humans crossed 
the Bering Strait about 12,000 years ago, and so evolutionary pressure in America until this time 
was not geared towards shyness or evasiveness. These naïve animals were unable to evade their 
new predator who arrived from Eurasia with well-developed hunting skills, and they were easily 
wiped out soon after humans entered the scene (Mosimann and Martin 1975, Diamond 1997, 
Leaky and Lewin 1996; Brook and Bowman 2002).  Since some extinct megafauna would have 
been excellent candidates for future domestication, the prospects of this continent’s inhabitants 
was changed forever, and the future of the world. 
  While this story seems plausible, no formal models have been developed that capture 
evolution along both human and wildlife dimensions.  Even analyses of the separate human and 
wildlife dimensions are lacking: no one has explicitly examined the human dimension, and little   4
has been done on the wildlife side.  Brook and Bowman (2002) claim Alroy’s (2001) extinction 
results  could  stem  from  unrealistic  assumptions  about  wildlife  naivety.    They  argue  Alroy’s 
overkill results stem from his assumption that North American wildlife maintained a constant 
level of naivety even though these wildlife populations dwindled due to human hunting pressures 
– wildlife populations never became more evasive but rather were always easy to kill.  There was 
no  natural  selection  process  to  reduce  naivety  and  make  the  wildlife  harder  to  kill.    By 
exogenously reducing the level of naivety (e.g., consistent with but not in direct response to 
human hunting pressure), Brook and Bowman find overkill may no longer hold; at least in a 
single species model in which wildlife and human population growth are independent, and there 
are no human investments in response to increased scarcity.  Brook and Bowman also cite a 
sizable literature that finds wildlife naivety drops quickly in response to hunting by humans or 
other completely novel predators.  But Brook and Bowman do not model wildlife responses 
explicitly, nor do they model human responses to increased scarcity.   
Herein we develop an analytical framework to capture the idea of endogenous human 
investments in hunting ability, and wildlife population responses to human hunting pressure.  We 
find investments in hunting ability may be more important than wildlife naivety in explaining the 
extinction of large, domesticable animals.  Plus our results add a twist to the story.  We find 
human  investments  in  hunting  ability  might  have  prevented  the  extermination  of  large, 
domesticable animals in both Eurasia and North America.  Human dimensions within the co-
evolutionary  process  could  have  saved  Eurasian  domesticable  animals.    The  reason  is  that 
humans make investments in response to the relative scarcity of prey species—over time hunters 
become more adept at hunting the less-scarce species.  We also find that conditions exist under 
which the co-evolutionary development of hunting skills in Eurasia could have prolonged the   5
existence of domesticable animals in North America.    But if the acquired Eurasian skills did not 
apply in exactly the same way to the new mix of species in North America, the incentives facing 
North American hunters may have biased additional investments towards hunting domesticable 
species, resulting in their demise.   
 
2. A Model of Hunting with Technological Investments 
Imagine  a  group  of  primitive  hunters,  consisting  of  N  identical  households.    They  sustain 
themselves  by  consuming  meat,  m,  from  two  species:    megafauna,  which  includes  large, 
domesticable animals (horses, camels, cattle) and minifauna (deer, hare).
5  For simplicity and 
because they are believed to have minimal impact on the likelihood of extinction (Bulte et al., 
2003), we do not address nutritional impacts of agriculture or gathering.
6  Utility, U, is a function 
of  meat  consumption  and  other  goods  like  clothes,  tools,  and  shelter,  denoted  v.    Utility  is 
defined as: 
(1) 
b b - =
1 v m U . 
Households maximize (1) subject to a time constraint: 
(2)    l = e +s+ y, 
where l is the total labor endowment, e is hunting effort, s is effort devoted to investing in new 
hunting technologies, and y measures effort to produce other goods.  Assume primitive hunters 
solve  a  series  of  static  labor  allocation  problems,  rather  than  a  single  dynamic  optimization 
problem, which is consistent with observations by Mithen (1990, p.224): “hunter-gatherers do 
                                                 
5  We use the commonly made distinction between ‘megafauna’ (animals heavier than 450 pounds) and ‘minifauna’ 
(other prey) to characterize the potential prey species that humans can harvest.   
6 Bulte et al. (2003) examine possible causes for the megafauna extinction in the Pleistocene.  They develop a model 
in which primitive man allocates his labor between hunting two wildlife species (megafauna and minifauna), 
agricultural production, and the production of non-food goods.  While agriculture is a substitute activity for hunting, 
they find the presence of agriculture has little bearing on whether megafauna go extinct.  The presence of a 
substitute prey is the most important factor.  Agriculture would have been viable in parts of Eurasia during the time 
frame being considered, while gathering would be the only relevant alternative in North America (Smith 1975).   6
not appear to plan subsistence activities over time scales longer than one year.”  This restriction 
is also consistent with more contemporary instances of open access resource exploitation (see 
Conrad 1995; Bulte and Horan 2003).  We abstract away from institutional change that might 
occur in response to changes in resource scarcity (see Ostrom 1990, Erickson and Gowdy 2000, 
Pezzey and Anderies 2003, Baker 2003). 
Assuming constant returns to scale to produce other goods, we choose units such that v = 
y.  Production of meat is given by the traditional Schaefer production function (Clark 1990).  
Assume  humans  do  not  discriminate  hunting  effort  between  and  among  different  types  of 
animals; they decide about the optimal level of aggregate effort.
7  This presumption is consistent 
with observations by Mithen (1999), who argues the predominant mode of hunting was on an 
encounter basis.  But although hunters non-selectively kill the species they come across, they do 
selectively invest in hunting technologies/knowledge to increase the catchability of those species 
they are more likely to encounter (Gamble 1999), thus improving their overall returns per unit 
effort.  We use the terms technology and knowledge interchangeably in what follows.  Following 
Mosimann  and  Martin,  Smith  (1975),  Brander  and  Taylor  and  others  who  have  looked  at 
resource extraction in a “simple economy,” we combine all megafauna into a single aggregate 
variable, x, focusing on large, domesticable animals like horses, cattle, and camels rather than, 
say mammoths.  We introduce heterogeneity into the megafauna population to examine the role 
of natural selection.
8   
                                                 
7 This assumption is not required for our results, but it is realistic and it simplifies the exposition relative to a model 
with selective harvests.  See Bulte et al. (2003) for a discussion of selective harvesting and bonus killings. 
8 In our model, evolution of the species (i.e., gradually shedding its naivety) is captured by natural selection 
resulting in an increased share of hard-to-catch animals in the population.  This approach is convenient but 
effectively puts a lower bound on naivety—if all individuals are hard-to-catch further evolution is not feasible.  In 
reality, naivety could fall over the very long term, enabling an ongoing “arms race” between predator and prey, in 
which both players continuously improve their type.  Nevertheless, because of tractability we chose to consider 
changes in relative abundance of experienced and naive animals within the population.  This allows us to show all 
mechanisms clearly; similar patterns could emerge when using alternative models of (co)evolution.   7
The megafauna population consists of two sub-populations.  Define xh to be the hard-to-
catch megafauna (H-Mega) sub-population, having a relatively small catchability coefficient, qxh.  
Define  xe  to  be  the  easy-to-catch  megafauna  (E-Mega)  species,  having  a  relatively  large 
catchability coefficient qxe, i.e., qxe>qxh.  Harvests of sub-population j (j=h, e) are represented by 
j x xj xj x e q m ) (q = , where qxe represents “effective hunting effort” in hunting megafauna, in which 
qx is an index of hunting technology or knowledge that improves the productivity of labor in 
hunting this species, i.e., a Hicks-neutral technology that augments catchability.   
Minifauna are also combined into an aggregate variable, z, in which we again have a 
hard-to-catch minifauna (H-Mini) sub-population, zh, and an easy-to-catch minifauna (E-Mini) 
sub-population, ze.  We define the harvests of these sub-populations by substituting z for x.  Total 
household meat consumption is 
(3)  z e x e z q z q e x q x q e m z z x x e ze h zh z e xe h xh x s q s q q q + = + + + = ] [ ] [  
where  j q q j xe j jh j )] 1 ( [ r r s - + =   represents  average  catchability  and  j jh j / = r   (j=x,z) 
represents the proportion of species j that is hard-to-catch. 
Investments of labor (e.g., spending time developing innovations) can affect the 
technological parameter qj (j=x,z).  Assume the relation is 
(4)   ò =
t
j j j dt s
0 ] [m q ,    1 ) 0 ( = = t j q   (j=x,z) 
where mj is a parameter.  Expression (4) says that the technological component of catchability 
depends on cumulative investments.  For now we do not address depreciation; we do examine its 
impacts when we consider how knowledge is transferred from Eurasia to North America.  For 
notational ease, define  j q¢ as cumulative past investments such that  j j j j s m q q + ¢ = .   
Although investment has cumulative effects, the primitive subsistence hunters do not plan   8
on  this  due  to  their  limited  foresight.    Substituting  expressions  (3)  and  (4)  into  the  static 
optimization problem defined by (1) and (2), the optimal levels of effort and investment are
9  
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Expression (5) illustrates that investments in technological innovations depend on the relative 
scarcity of the species.  More investments are spent on species v when v is abundant relative to j.  
Aggregate investments also depend on past investment levels, and investments are bounded from 
above because the marginal product of effort in hunting is always greater than the marginal 
product  of  labor  in  knowledge  generation  when  cumulative  investment  is  sufficiently  large.  
Accordingly,  relative  scarcity  during  the  innovation  process  drives  the  ultimate  mix  of 
innovations  –  i.e.,  innovations  are  scarcity-dependent  and  path-dependent.    This  implies  the 
initial immigrants to North America would have arrived with an irreversible initial set of relative 
skills that (i) would probably not have been developed in North America, and (ii) may not be the 
most compatible with the relative wildlife scarcities that existed in North America at that time.  
Consequently,  outcomes  in  North  America  would  be  both  scarcity-dependent  and  path-
dependent, driven in part by the co-evolution that occurred on Eurasian hunting grounds. 
 
Human and wildlife dynamics 
We  now  turn  to  human  and  wildlife  dynamics,  which  are  based  on  a  modified  form  of  a 
                                                 
9 Equation (4) exhibits constant returns to scale in labor, which makes the objective function linear in the amount of 
labor allocated to investments.  The result is that investments are reallocated quickly as relative scarcity changes.  If   9
conventional  predator-prey  model  (e.g.,  Freedman  1980).    Such  models  have  been  used  to 
examine human-wildlife interactions in other  contexts (e.g., Brander and Taylor 1998).  We 
extend this earlier work by distinguishing between multiple wildlife sub-populations so we can 
consider natural selection in a co-evolutionary context.   
Human population growth (fertility) depends on the available food supply, particularly 
for people living close to subsistence (see Dasgupta 1995; Frisch 1978; Nerlove 1991, 1993).  
Let the dynamics of the human population be  
(7)  ) / 1 ( m S rN N - =  ,  
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of the population and S is a subsistence rate representing the 
minimum quantity of food that humans need to support themselves.  From expression (7), if S/m 
>1,  the  population  growth  rate  is  negative  and  the  population  diminishes.    If  1 / = m S ,  the 
population  does  not  change.  The  population  grows  when  1 / < m S .  The  population  growth 
function in (7) rests on the assumption that food intake single-handedly determines fertility. 
  Now consider the ecological side of the model, starting with the growth of megafauna.  
The megafauna population consists of two heterogeneous sub-populations, in which growth of 
one  sub-population  depends  on  the  other.    H-Mega  animals  bear  either  H-Mega  or  E-Mega 
offspring; likewise, E-Mega animals bear either E-Mega or H-Mega offspring.  Let  xh h  denote 
the proportion of H-Mega offspring that are H-Mega;  xe h is the proportion of E-Mega offspring 
that are E-Mega.  Since heredity is likely to bias the distribution of offspring’s evasive skills 
along the lines of parentage, assume  5 . 0    , 5 . 0 > > xe xh h h .  The H-Mega sub-population grows 
according to 
                                                                                                                                                             
there were decreasing returns to investment, then reallocations would occur more slowly.  This could be detrimental 
to scarce species that are slow-growing and easy-to-catch.   10
(8)   h x xh x e h h x e x xe h x xh h x h ex Nq k x x x x b x b x d x q a h h - + - - + + - = / ) ( ) 1 (   
where dx is the natural mortality rate, bxxh is the birth rate, ax is the intrinsic growth rate (ax=bx-
dx), and kx is the carrying capacity which introduces compensated, density-dependent growth into 
the  model  (accounting  for  other  limiting  factors  such  as  habitat  and  food  availability,  other 
predators,  etc.).    The  stock  grows  due  to  births  within  both  the  H-Mega  and  E-Mega  sub-
populations; it is reduced by natural mortality, competition among population members living in 
a fixed habitat, and human harvests.  Growth of the E-Mega stock is given by switching the h 
and e subscripts in equation (8).  Growth of the aggregate megafauna stock, x, is 
(9)   x Ne k x x x x x x x s q a - - = ) / 1 (  . 
We obtain the expressions for the growth of the aggregate minifauna population and sub-
populations by substituting z for x in the analogous expressions for megafauna.  The parameters 
and  variables  can  be  interpreted  analogously  to  the  megafauna.    Aggregate  growth  of  the 
minifauna stock is 
(10)  ez N k z z z z z z q s a - - = ) / 1 (  .   
 
Natural selection and co-evolution in Eurasia 
Natural selection affects the average catchability for each species.  We define natural selection as 
changes  in  the  proportion  of  species  j  that  are  hard-to-catch, j r   (j=z,x).    Natural  selection 
rewards traits that increase an individual’s chances of survival or fertility or both.  Acting as a 
“filter”  through  which  genes  are  passed  from  one  generation  to  the  next,  natural  selection 
ultimately changes the population’s composition of E-Mega and H-Mega animals. We define the 
rate  of  natural  selection  of  H-Mega  animals  within  the  megafauna  species  by 
) / / )( 1 ( / e e h h x x x x x x x    - - = r r r .  Natural selection favors H-Mega animals when  0 / > x x r r  ;   11
it  favors  E-Mega  animals  when  0 / < x x r r  .    The  selection  rate  is  defined  analogously  for 
minifauna:  selection favors H-Mini or E-Mini animals when  0 / > z z r r   or  0 / < z z r r  .   
Several factors determine the rate of natural selection within a species.  Consider the rate 
of  selection  of  H-Mega  animals  within  the  domesticable  species  (the  rate  for  minifauna  is 
analogous) 
 (11)      ] ) ( )
1
)( 1 ( )
1
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The relevant tradeoffs occur within the bracketed ([ ]) term on the right hand side of expression 
(11).  The terms  j bh  (j=h,e) represent a sub-population’s own-fertility effects - the direct fertility 
effects a sub-population has on its own sub-population.  The terms  x x e b r r h / ) 1 )( 1 ( - -  and 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( x x h b r r h - -   represent  the  sub-populations’  cross-fertility  effects  -  the  direct  fertility 
effects that a sub-population has on the other sub-population.  Greater own-fertility by one sub-
population has a positive impact on the rate of natural selection for that sub-population.  The 
more one sub-population supplements its own kind, the greater its relative growth.  In contrast, 
greater cross-fertility by one sub-population has a negative impact on the rate of natural selection 
for that sub-population.   
In the absence of hunting, the fertility effects are the only factors influencing natural 
selection.  Here the steady state value of  x r  is unique and stable (see Appendix A).  With 
hunting,  however,  an  additional  term  arises:  Ne q q x xh xe q ) ( - .    This  term  shows  that  greater 
differences in catchability, as augmented by qx, favor selection of the H-Mega animals, as does 
greater aggregate hunting effort.  Technological change could also indirectly impact selection to 
the extent that increases in qx impact meat consumption, resource scarcity, and therefore the   12
human population N.  Because changes in  x r  and qx affect changes in N, the uniqueness of a 
steady state value of  x r  is now uncertain, as is the monotonicity of the path  x x r r /  .   
 
Extinction of domesticable species in Eurasia 
Minifauna and megafauna have several differences.  Assume minifauna (e.g., deer and hare) 
replenish faster than megafauna (e.g., horses and cattle), i.e.,  x z a a ³ , and are more difficult to 
catch, i.e.,  xh ze q q £ .  Megafauna tend to congregate in herds, for instance, which makes them 
relatively simple to detect and harvest.
10  Assume  z z x x s a s a / / < , where the ratio of a species’ 
intrinsic  growth  rate  to  its  average  catchability  coefficient  measures  a  species’  average 
biotechnical productivity (see Clark 1990, p.315). 
  From expressions (9) and (10), an interior steady state solution ( 0 = = z x   , with x>0 and z
 
>0) only exists for points (x,z) on the line segment: 















where 0 < x £ kx, and 0< z £ kz.  Rewrite condition (12) as: 
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The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of expression (13) is positive, as is the coefficient of 
x.  Thus, z is positive for very small values of x, and is increasing in x. 
For an interior equilibrium solution, the human population should also be constant 
( 0 = N   and N > 0); m=S from equation (7), which implies   
                                                 
10 This presumption applies to domesticable megafauna such as horse, cattle, sheep etc.  One of the conditions for 
easy domestication, as discussed by Diamond (1992, 1997) is that animals accept leadership from another animal in 
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While not illustrated here, the equilibrium conditions (13) and (14) could easily be plotted in a z-
x phase plane.  Drawing minifauna z on the vertical axis and megafauna x on the horizontal axis, 
condition (13) is an upward sloping line segment and condition (14) is a downward sloping line 
segment, both with positive intercepts. 
  Now define the condition to determine megafauna species survival or extinction given 
minifauna.  An interior equilibrium exists for domesticable species survival if and only if the two 
line segments cross, and this only happens if the intercept in equation (14) is greater than the 
intercept in equation (13):  












If (15) holds (f > 0), a unique interior solution exists and may be found by solving expressions 
(7), (9) and (10).  If the reverse inequality holds (f < 0), an interior solution does not exist and 
megafauna—with  low  average  biotechnical  productivity—are  driven  to  extinction  by  the 
expanding human population, feeding mainly on minifauna.   
  From (15) we ascertain the impacts of evolution and technological investment on the 
likelihood of species survival.  Consider first the impact of evolution.  From condition (11), the 
initial impact of harvesting is to increase the natural selection of hard-to-catch members of both 
species, decreasing both  z s  and  x s .  But the rate of natural selection is not monotonic since 
increased wildlife scarcity creates fluctuations in e and N, which occurs in such predator-prey 
models (e.g., Brander and Taylor 1998).  In either case, however, the natural selection of harder-
to-catch animals within a population decreases both  z s  and  z s .  The first RHS term in (15) is 
increased, decreasing the likelihood of extinction.  This occurs because the human population   14
depends more on megafauna for food whenever minifauna catchability is decreased, other things 
being equal.  The second RHS term in (15) depends on how changes in average catchability 
affect the ratio  z z s s / .  An increase in the ratio (i.e., minifauna become easier to catch relative 
to  megafauna)  reduces  the  probability  of  extinction;  a  decrease  in  the  ratio  increases  the 
likelihood.  It is unclear a priori whether natural selection will increase or decrease the ratio; 
both are possibilities.  If the ratio is increased, it is unclear whether the net effect of natural 
selection is to increase or decrease the likelihood of extinction (i.e., whether the effect on the 
first or second RHS terms dominates).  If minifauna experience proportionately greater natural 
selection than megafauna in response to increased hunting pressure, natural selection could cause 
a greater chance of extinction than if selection did not occur within either population. 
  Technological  advances  trigger  the  opposite  results  relative  to  decreased  average 
catchability.  The first RHS term in (15) decreases for increases in  z q , which ups the likelihood 
of extinction.  The second RHS term in (15) depends on the ratio  x z q q / .  An increase in this 
ratio decreases the likelihood of extinction because minifauna become easier to catch relative to 
megafauna.  We expect the ratio to increase because, as megafauna become scarce due to their 
initial low relative average biotechnical productivity rate, hunters have incentives to invest in 
technologies  to  capture  the  more  abundant  species.    The  result  is  that  the  effective  average 
biotechnical productivity rate of minifauna is reduced relative to that of megafauna, making 
extinction less likely.  The ability of hunters to invest selectively in harvesting technologies 
could help to conserve the more vulnerable species. 
 
Coming to North America 
When  humans  immigrated  into  North  America,  they  came  with  an  advanced  set  of   15
hunting knowledge and technologies.
11  They again faced groups of minifauna and megafauna in 
the  new  world,  and  the  general  species  classes  had  both  familiar  and new  species.    Habitat 
conditions  were  likely  somewhat  different  and  so  was  animal  behavior.    Their  accumulated 
specialized knowledge could not have been transferred to this new set of species/conditions on a 
perfect one-to-one basis.  Some strategies/technologies found effective for catching megafauna 
in Eurasia could have been (i) fully applicable new world megafauna, (ii) partially applicable to 
new world megafauna, depreciated somewhat as hunters would have to learn new strategies to 
deal  with  their  new  prey,  (iii)  applicable  to  both  new  world  megafauna  and  minifauna 
(generalized skill), or (iv) not applicable to new world megafauna but instead applicable to new 
world minifauna (skill transfer).  The same story applies to minifauna.  
Denote the level of technology/knowledge when hunters left Eurasia to be 
EA
x q  and 
EA
z q , 
so that the accumulated technology in Eurasia is  1 -
EA
x q  and  1 -
EA
z q  (recall  1 ) 0 ( = = t j q , j=x,z).  
We capture the notions of cross-species skill transfer and depreciation of specialized hunting 
abilities according to: 






j V e q d e q q + - + - - - + = ,    j=x,z 
where 
NA
j q   represents  the  efficiency  index  for  hunting  species  j  in  North  America,  ejÎ(0,1) 
represents the proportion of skills relevant for hunting species j in Eurasia and are more relevant 
to  species  v  in  North  America,  j V is  the  proportion  of  accumulated  knowledge  for  hunting 
                                                 
11 The earliest North Americans, who migrated from Eurasia across the Bering Strait, are now known as the Clovis 
people, named after the first important site examined near Clovis, New Mexico in 1932 (Diamond 1992).  Clovis 
people  used  stone  tools,  and  are  renowned  for  their  fluted  projectile  points,  although  some  groups  apparently 
favored fish-tailed projectiles and others bifacially trimmed points.  From excavations we now know that they used 
fluted projectiles ranging from 1.5 to 5 inches, but also tools like bone tools, hammer stones, scrapers, and various 
woodworking and butchering artifacts. The diversity in tools and hunting weapons illustrates the various ‘investment 
decisions’ made by these people. 
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species j in Eurasia that becomes generalized in North America, and  j d  represents depreciation 
of remaining skills due to differences in North American and Eurasian species/habitats. 
Recall that specialization in Eurasia ensured that effective catch per unit effort ( j j
EA
j s q , 
for j=x,z) favored minifauna since it was the faster growing species, and it was this specialization 
that  could  have  helped  both  species  groups  to  survive  in  Eurasia.    The  key  implication  of 
equation  (16)  is  that  this  minifauna  bias  may  have  been  diminished  upon  arrival  in  North 
America, due to the depreciation/redistribution of skills (because humans would be hunting a 
different mix of species in different habitats in North America) or the initial relative abundance 
of  megafauna  or  both.
12    If  these  effects  resulted  in  effective  catch  per  unit  effort  favoring 
megafauna  in  America,  then  humans  would  have  had  incentives  to  invest  in  megafauna 
technologies  in  those  early  years  on  the  new  continent.    This  could  have  led  to  greater 
cumulative  megafauna  investments  in  North  America  than  in  Eurasia,  increasing  the  risk  of 




For  our  numerical  analysis,  suppose  hunting  begins  in  a  pristine  ecosystem  with  humans 
possessing no specialized hunting technologies or knowledge (i.e.,  1 = = z x q q ), like that which 
might  have  occurred  in  Eurasia  when  hominids  first  arrived.    Co-evolution  of  species  and 
investments occurs over the next several millennia until an equilibrium is reached, although 
reaching an equilibrium in Eurasia is not required.  Next, the advanced hunters move to another 
pristine ecosystem, North America.  Appendix B provides the model calibration details.   
                                                 
12 Humans had depleted megafauna to low levels of abundance in Eurasia.  In contrast, megafauna were somewhat 
abundant in North America when humans first arrived (Diamond 1992).    17
Table 1 reports the simulation results for eight scenarios.  Scenario 1 assumes there is no 
evolution among hunters or their wildlife prey: neither in Eurasia nor in America.  Wildlife 
natural selection does not occur.  In a pristine setting, 50 percent of each species would be hard-
to-catch  and  50  percent  would  be  easy-to-catch.    This  ratio  is  maintained  throughout  this 
scenario, in effect turning off the natural selection process.  Human hunting technologies do not 
evolve  while  humans  are  in  Eurasia  because  there  is  no  investment.    Accordingly,  hunters 
entering North America are identical to those that initially entered Eurasia, and the species being 
hunted are identical on each continent.  The results for Eurasian and North American species are 
identical:  extinction of megafauna within 447 years.   
Natural selection (but not investments) is allowed in Scenario 2.  Again, an identical 
group of hunters enters both Eurasia and later North America, with wildlife on each continent 
initially being hunted in an identical, pristine state.  Comparing scenarios 1 and 2 highlights the 
effects of natural selection—when selection is possible, extinction takes another century on both 
continents.    This  result  occurs  because  natural  selection  decreases  average  catchability  of 
megafauna by more than minifauna: 76 percent of megafauna are hard-to-catch compared while 
only 67 percent of minifauna fit this category, as compared to an even split in scenario 1.  But by 
itself, natural selection does not prevent extinction of megafauna, either in Eurasia or in North 
America.  That species quickly adapt and lose their naivety is consistent with evidence that 
wildlife quickly adapts to new predators (see Brook and Bowman 2002).  Our extinction result 
can be interpreted to contradict Brook and Bowman’s (2002) single species model results.
13   The 
results  differ  across  models  because  we  account  for  the  availability  of  a  substitute  resource 
(minifauna) that can sustain a growing population as the minifauna are hunted to extinction, and 
                                                 
13 Considering megafauna extinction in Australia, Brook and Bowman find a positive probability of extinction over 
a range of prey naivety indices, although the overall probability declines as prey grow less naïve.  It is unclear how   18
it is the relative impact of natural selection on the naivety of the two species that matters.  We 
find natural selection does not sufficiently reduce megafauna naivety relative to minifauna; both 
species  become  less  naïve,  but  the  average  biotechnical  productivity  of  minifauna  is  still 
sufficiently greater than that of megafauna. 
The next scenarios (3-8) illustrate the case of co-evolution, in which humans respond to 
the relative scarcity of wildlife by investing in hunting technologies/knowledge.  Here we find 
that megafauna always survive in Eurasia—human investments made in response to the relative 
species scarcity prevent megafauna extinction.  Before the final Eurasian horse or cow has been 
killed,  humans  have  switched  their  focus  to  an  alternative  prey  base.    For  North  America, 
however, the result critically depends on how the investments in technology/knowledge transfer 
to the North American ecosystem.   
Scenario  3  represents  a  baseline  case  in  which  investments  in  technology/knowledge 
occur in combination with natural selection of the species, and skills transfer from Eurasia to 
North America on a one-to-one basis.  We find extinction does not occur on either continent:  
species-scarcity-induced investments transfer hunting pressure  from megafauna to minifauna.  
Natural selection within the megafauna population is reduced, but is increased among minifauna.  
A key result is the outcomes in Eurasia and North America are identical even though humans 
arrived in North America with an advanced set of hunting skills and tools.  Eurasian co-evolution 
saves the new world megafauna, even though the technology evolved separately from the North 
American species.  This contrasts with the hypothesis that co-evolution in Eurasia is responsible 
for North American extinctions.  Rather, co-evolution in Eurasia enables humans to conserve the 
North American megafauna when it reaches low levels of abundance - even with no additional 
                                                                                                                                                             
naïve the prey in our model are relative to their index, so their model might also predict extinction.  But we contend 
that relative naivety, not absolute naivety, matters.  Their focus on a single prey represents an important restriction.    19
investment  in  North  America.    The  key  to  this  result,  as  we  show  next,  is  that  all  of  the 
technological/knowledge developments are perfectly transferable to North America.   
Scenario  4  illustrates  the  effects  when  minifauna-specific  technology/knowledge 
depreciates across continents.  All the accumulated knowledge for hunting minifauna is useless 
(i.e., fully depreciated) on arrival in North America, whereas all the accumulated knowledge for 
hunting megafauna remains intact.  While this should bias hunting pressure towards megafauna, 
particularly  since  they  are  initially  plentiful  in  North  America,  it  does  not  take  long  before 
investments in minifauna technologies become profitable.  These investments ease the pressure 
on megafauna, and survival of both species is the result.  Depreciation of knowledge/technology 
has little effect. 
The final four scenarios (5-8) illustrate how megafauna can go extinct in North America 
with  some  cross-species  knowledge  transfers  or  when  some  knowledge  generalizes  for  both 
species.  Under Scenario 5, 30 percent of the knowledge gained in hunting one species in Europe 
applies to hunting the other species in North America.  Now North American megafauna go 
extinct.  A smaller cross-species knowledge transfer also results in extinction, although the time 
interval is large (e.g., > 3,000 years when e=0.1).  The cross-species knowledge transfer in this 
case goes in both directions:  30 percent of the accumulated knowledge for hunting European 
minifauna (megafauna) is more applicable to North American megafauna (minifauna).  While 
unreported in Table 1, we find extinction occurs in less than half the time (1098 years) if the 
knowledge transfer only goes in one direction, reducing hunting efficiency for megafauna and 
increasing minifauna hunting efficiency. 
Scenario 6 shows that when 25 percent of the knowledge acquired in Eurasia generalizes 
to North America, megafauna again go extinct.  Less generalizable knowledge also results in   20
extinction,  although  it  takes  longer;  the  extinction  interval  would  be  shorter  if  megafauna 
knowledge was more generalizable in the new world than was minifauna knowledge. 
Finally, scenarios 7 and 8 illustrate that the extinction time intervals are much shorter 
when knowledge is both transferable and generalizable.  Comparing scenarios 7 & 8 with 5 & 6 
shows that generalizable knowledge matters more to megafauna extinction than transferability—
changes in generalizable knowledge have a greater marginal impact on extinction intervals.  We 
also ran simulations with various levels of depreciation and found no effect.   
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Some theories suggest the European conquest of America and its ensuing consequences can be 
traced back to humble beginnings—Eurasians were the first to domesticate megafauna and this 
event eventually translated into the world order we now know.  This begs the question why 
domestication started there and not elsewhere.  It has been postulated that Eurasians had a larger 
set of animal to choose from as suitable megafauna candidates on other continents as America 
and Australia suffered from major collapse shortly after the first humans entered the local scene.  
This collapse, supposedly, did not happen in Europe because the ‘prey base’ was not naive and 
unsuspecting.  Instead, it was trained by many thousands of years of predation by Neanderthals 
and early modern humans.   
  In a recent paper, Brook and Bowman challenge this view.  They argue that megafauna 
extinction  in  the  Americas  and  Australia  may  not  have  been  the  inevitable  outcome  of  an 
encounter between smart hunters and naive prey.  Evidence exists to suggest that prey species are 
able to learn and adapt quickly, casting doubts on the overkill hypothesis.  But the capacity of 
prey to adapt is only half the story.  We explore herein the story’s logical complement—hunter’s 
behavior.  Now what matters is explaining the interaction between evasive animals and humans   21
investing in ever-superior hunting techniques.   
One can view our numerical results in two ways.  One take is that extinction occurs 
because  Eurasian  co-evolution  was  not  completely  compatible  with  the  North  American 
ecosystem.  Another view is that neither the Eurasian nor the North American ecosystems would 
have survived in tact if it were not for co-evolution.  Co-evolution saved Eurasian species from 
certain extinction.  In North America, co-evolution prolongs extinction relative to the case in 
which co-evolution does not occur (scenarios 1 and 2).   But regardless of your perspective, it is 
apparent that human investments may have mattered as much as, if not more, than selection and 
evolution on the prey side.
14  Economics matters, both in Eurasia and the new world, and the 
interaction with the ecological system may trigger unexpected outcomes.  
  We appreciate that mathematical models might never tell us the answer to the question of 
why  domesticable  wildlife  went  extinct  in  the  Americas  but  not  in  Eurasia.    These  events 
happened long ago and no current method exists to validate these sorts of models (Brook and 
Bowman  2002).    But  these  models  can  provide  insight  into  what  may  have  happened,  and 
hopefully they can spur further research, both theoretical and applied, into the issues that seem to 
matter.  If researchers can at least identify what may matter, science has more direction to look 
for the clues that could eventually help to validate or reject alterative theories. 
 
                                                 
14 One could contend that natural selection in our model is limited by our specification and parameter choices, and 
that cross-continental natural selection differences over the course of hundreds of thousands of years prior to human 
arrival in North America would have resulted in much larger catchability coefficients for all North American 
species.  We could exogenously increase all North America catchability coefficients to account for larger-scale 
differences between North American and Eurasian catchability.  The result, however, depends on how relative 
catchability is changed.  For instance, in our baseline scenario 3 with perfect knowledge transfer, all North 
American catchability coefficients could be uniformly increased by up to 75 percent and the results would be 
unchanged: megafauna extinction would still result.    22
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Appendix A 
This Appendix shows the existence of a unique and stable value of  x r  in the absence of hunting.  
An analogous discussion holds for  z r .  From (11), an equilibrium (steady state) for  x r  occurs 
when either  1 = x r  or when the following condition holds 
(A1)  0 )]
1
)( 1 ( )
1
















h h h  
Since  1 = x r  is impossible when  1 < xj h  (j=h,e), an equilibrium can only occur when condition 
(A1) is satisfied.  Denote the first term on the left-hand-side (LHS) of (A1) by c.  Denote the 
second term by x( x r ), which is strictly increasing in  x r .  Note that x(1)> c, and x(0)<c.  By the 
intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique value  ) 1 , 0 (
*Î x r  such that x(
*
x r )=c: a unique 
steady state exists.  The sign of  x x r r /   depends on the sign of the LHS of (A1).  Because x( x r ) 
is monotonically increasing in  x r , we have  x x r r /  >0 when 
*
x x r r < , and  0 / < x x r r   when 
*
N N r r > : the unique equilibrium is stable.  Finally,  5 . 0




Appendix B – Parameters for the simulation models. 
We selected parameter values to be realistic, but obviously we are limited by the fact that no 
good data exists from 12,000 years ago to calibrate a model.  We calibrate our model keeping 
one stylized fact in mind: megafauna went extinct in North America, but did not in Eurasia.  
 
Modeling wildlife:  According to Pratt and Gwynne (1977) and Prins et al. (2000), a reasonable 
assumption for the carrying capacity for herbivores is approximately 4 ha/AU, or 64 AU per 
square mile (1 AU [animal unit] measures 1,000 pounds of living animal).  Assume early human 
hunters consider 30 percent of biomass as “prey”, and half of this biomass is megafauna (e.g., 
horses and cows) and the other half is minifauna (e.g., deer).  Given the available range in the 
late  Pleistocene,  this  translates  into  kj=30  AU  (i=x,z).    Mosimann  and  Martin  assume  the 
available range for herbivores in North America in the late Pleistocene was 3 million square 
miles; the rest of the land surface was unsuitable, possibly covered with ice sheets.  Although   25
Eurasia is bigger, we assume kj=30 AU in Eurasia; numerical simulations indicate this choice has 
a small impact on the results.  Assume the intrinsic growth rate of megafauna is 25% (Mosimann 
and Martin), with dx = 0.05.  Finally, assume  jv h =0.8 (j=x,z, v=e,h). 
 
Modeling  human  population  and  behavior:  Assume  an  initial  population  of  100  households.  
Following Whittington and Dyke (1984, p.454) who present “parameters based upon empirical 
evidence generally acceptable to archeologists and human ecologists,” we assume r = 0.0443.  
Assume a prehistoric working day for the representative household (man, woman and two kids) 
has about 20 hours per day (7300 hours per year), and that meat is the predominant source of 
food so that b=0.8.  Finally, Dasgupta (1993) estimates that active humans should consume 2000 
calories (0.73 AU) per day to sustain themselves, and for a household of four we compute that 
S=2.9 AU per year. 
 
Modeling harvesting of megafauna and investments:  Bulte et al. (2003) adopt a value of q = 
8.3´10
-11 for minifauna and megafauna harvesting, which assumes each species is of uniform 
naivety.  For non-uniform naivety, we assume qzh = 8.3´10
-11, and that more naïve minifauna are 
60 percent easier to catch qzh = 0.6qze.  The analogous catchability coefficients for megaufauna 
are 20 percent larger—qxh = 1.2qzh and qxe = 1.2qze.  Finally, the investment parameter is set at mz = 
mx = 4.57´10
-4, which is equal to 2/bl.  Table 1. 
  Eurasia Simulation  North America Simulation 
     Scenario  Time (in years) to 
extinction of 
domesticable species 
(if extinction occurs) 




z r  in 
equilibrium 
Time (in years) to 
extinction of 
domesticable species 
(if extinction occurs) 
Initial level of 
technology 
x q  
Initial level of 
technology 
z q  




z r  in 
equilibrium 
1. No natural selection, 
no investment 
447  0.5  0.5  447  0  0  1  1 
                 
2. Natural selection, no 
investment 
588  0.76  0.67  588  0  0  1  1 
                 
3.-8. Natural selection 
and investment 
               
3.  d=0,  e=0, V = 0  ----  0.73  0.71  ----  1.17  1.70  0.73  0.71 
                 
4.  dz=1,  e=0,  V=0  ----  0.73  0.71  ----  1.17  1.0  0.73  0.71 
                 
5.  d=0,  e=0.3,  V=0  ----  0.73  0.71  2349  1.33  1.54  0.74  0.71 
                 
6.  d=0,  e=0, V =0.25  ----  0.73  0.71  1706  1.34  1.74  0.74  0.71 
                 
7.  d=0,  e=0.3,  V=0.1  ----  0.73  0.71  935  1.4  1.56  0.74  0.71 
                 
8.  d=0,  e=0.1,  V=0.25  ----  0.73  0.71  946  1.39  1.69  0.74  0.71 
Note: Parameters without subscripts means that the same value is applied to both species. 
 
 
 